哲学史-philosophy of history(英文版)-第9章

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inconsistent　features　in　their　career；　for　it　was　they　who　best　understood　affairs；　from　whom
others　learned；　and　approved；　or　at　least　acquiesced　in　their　policy。　For　that　Spirit　which　had
taken　this　fresh　step　in　history　is　the　inmost　soul　of　all　individuals；　but　in　a　state　of　unconsciousness
which　the　great　men　in　question　aroused。　Their　fellows；　therefore；　follow　these　soul…leaders；　for
they　feel　the　irresistible　power　of　their　own　inner　Spirit　thus　embodied。　If　we　go　on　to　cast　a　look
at　the　fate　of　these　World…Historical　persons；　whose　vocation　it　was　to　be　the　agents　of　the
World…Spirit；　—　we　shall　find　it　to　have　been　no　happy　one。　They　attained　no　calm　enjoyment；
their　whole　life　was　labour　and　trouble；　their　whole　nature　was　nought　else　but　their
master…passion。　When　their　object　is　attained　they　fall　off　like　empty　hulls　from　the　kernel。　They
die　early；　like　Alexander；　they　are　murdered；　like　Caesar；　transported　to　St。　Helena。；　like
Napoleon。　This　fearful　consolation　—　that　historical　men　have　not　enjoyed　what　is　called
happiness；　and　of　which　only　private　life　（and　this　may　be　passed　under　very　various　external
circumstances）　is　capable；　—　this　consolation　those　may　draw　from　history；　who　stand　in　need　of
it；　and　it　is　craved　by　Envy　—　vexed　at　what　is　great　and　transcendent；　—　striving；　therefore；　to
depreciate　it；　and　to　find　some　flaw　in　it。　Thus　in　modern　times　it　has　been　demonstrated　ad
nauseam　that　princes　are　generally　unhappy　on　their　thrones；　in　consideration　of　which　the
possession　of　a　throne　is　tolerated；　and　men　acquiesce　in　the　fact　that　not　themselves　but　the
personages　in　question　are　its　occupants。　The　Free　Man；　we　may　observe；　is　not　envious；　but
gladly　recognises　what　is　great　and　exalted；　and　rejoices　that　it　exists。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　34

It　is　in　the　light　of　those　mon　elements　which　constitute　the　interest　and　therefore　the　passions
of　individuals；　that　these　historical　men　are　to　be　regarded。　They　are　great　men；　because　they
willed　and　acplished　something　great；　not　a　mere　fancy；　a　mere　intention；　but　that　which　met
the　case　and　fell　in　with　the　needs　of　the　age。　This　mode　of　considering　them　also　excludes　the
so…called　“psychological”　view；　which　—　serving　the　purpose　of　envy　most　effectually　…　contrives
so　to　refer　all　actions　to　the　heart；　—　to　bring　them　under　such　a　subjective　aspect　—　as　that　their
authors　appear　to　have　done　everything　under　the　impulse　of　some　passion；　mean　or　grand；　—
some　morbid　craving；　—　and　on　account　of　these　passions　and　cravings　to　have　been　not　moral
men。　Alexander　of　Macedon　partly　subdued　Greece；　and　then　Asia；　therefore　he　was　possessed
by　a　morbid　craving　for　conquest。　He　is　alleged　to　have　acted　from　a　craving　for　fame；　for
conquest；　and　the　proof　that　these　were　the　impelling　motives　is　that　he　did　that　which　resulted　in
fame。　What　pedagogue　has　not　demonstrated　of　Alexander　the　Great　—　of　Julius　Caesar　—　that
they　were　instigated　by　such　passions；　and　en；　—　whence　the
conclusion　immediately　follows　that　he；　the　pedagogue；　is　a　better　man　than　they；　because　he　has
not　such　passions；　a　proof　of　which　lies　in　the　fact　that　he　does　not　conquer　Asia；　—　vanquish
Darius　and　Porus；　—　but　while　he　enjoys　life　himself　lets　others　enjoy　it　too。　These　psychologists
are　particularly　fond　of　contemplating　those　peculiarities　of　great　historical　figures　which　appertain
to　them　as　private　persons。　Man　must　eat　and　drink；　he　sustains　relations　to　friends　and
acquaintances；　he　has　passing　impulses　and　ebullitions　of　temper。　“No　man　is　a　hero　to　his
valet…de…chambre；”　is　a　well…known　proverb；　I　have　added　—　and　Goethe　repeated　it　ten　years
later　—　“but　not　because　the　former　is　no　hero；　but　because　the　latter　is　a　valet。”　He　takes　off　the
hero's　boots；　assists　him　to　bed；　knows　that　he　prefers　champagne；　&c。　Historical　personages
waited　upon　in　historical　literature　by　such　psychological　valets；　e　poorly　off；　they　are　brought
down　by　these　their　attendants　to　a　level　with　—　or　rather　a　few　degrees　below　the　level　of　—　the
morality　of　such　exquisite　discerners　of　spirits。　The　Thersites　of　Homer　who　abuses　the　kings　is　a
standing　figure　for　all　times。　Blows　—　that　is　beating　with　a　solid　cudgel　—　he　does　not　get　in　every
age　as　in　the　Homeric　one；　but　his　envy；　his　egotism；　is　the　thorn　which　he　has　to　carry　in　his　flesh；
and　the　undying　worm　that　gnaws　him　is　the　tormenting　consideration　that　his　excellent　views　and
vituperations　remain　absolutely　without　result　in　the　world。　But　our　satisfaction　at　the　fate　of
Thersitism　also；　may　have　its　sinister　side。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　35

A　World…historical　individual　is　not　so　unwise　as　to　indulge　a　variety　of　wishes　to　divide　his
regards。　He　is　devoted　to　the　One　Aim；　regardless　of　all　else。　It　is　even　possible　that　such　men
may　treat　other　great；　even　sacred　interests；　inconsiderately；　conduct　which　is　indeed　obnoxious　to
moral　reprehension。　But　so　mighty　a　form　must　trample　down　many　an　innocent　flower…crush　to
pieces　many　an　object　in　its　path。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　36

The　special　interest　of　passion　is　thus　inseparable　from　the　active　development　of　a　general
principle：　for　it　is　from　the　special　and　determinate　and　from　its　negation；　that　the　Universal　results。
Particularity　contends　with　its　like；　and　some　loss　is　involved　in　the　issue。　It　is　not　the　general　idea
that　is　implicated　in　opposition　and　bat；　and　that　is　exposed　to　danger。　It　remains　in　the
background；　untouched　and　uninjured。　This　may　be　called　the　cunning　of　reason；　—　that　it　sets
the　passions　to　work　for　itself；　while　that　which　develops　its　existence　through　such　impulsion　pays
the　penalty　and　suffers　loss。　For　it　is　phenomenal　being　that　is　so　treated；　and　of　this；　part　is　of　no
value；　part　is　positive　and　real。　The　particular　is　for　the　most　part　of　too　trifling　value　as　pared
with　the　general：　individuals　are　sacrificed　and　abandoned。　The　Idea　pays　the　penalty　of
determinate　existence　and　of　corruptibility；　not　from　itself；　but　from　the　passions　of　individuals。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　37

But　though　we　might　tolerate　the　idea　that　individuals；　their　desires　and　the　gratification　of　them；
are　thus　sacrificed；　and　their　happiness　given　up　to　the　empire　of　chance；　to　which　it　belongs；　and
that　as　a　general　rule；　individuals　e　under　the　category　of　means　to　an　ulterior　end；　—　there　is
one　aspect　of　human　individuality　which　we　should　hesitate　to　regard　in　that　subordinate　light；　even
in　relation　to　the　highest；　since　it　is　absolutely　no　subordinate　element；　but　exists　in　those　individuals
as　inherently　eternal　and　divine。　I　mean　morality；　ethics；　religion。　Even　when　speaking　of　the
realisation　of　the　great　ideal　aim　by　means　of　individuals；　the　subjective　element　in　them　—　their
interest　and　that　of　their　cravings　and　impulses；　their　views　and　judgments；　though　exhibited　as　the
merely　formal　side　of　their　existence；　—　was　spoken　of　as　having　an　infinite　right　to　be　consulted。
The　first　idea　that　presents　itself　in　speaking　of　means　is　that　of　something　external　to　the　object；
and　having　no　share　in　the　object　itself。　But　merely　natural　things　—　even　the　monest　lifeless
objects　—　used　as　means；　must　be　of　such　a　kind　as　adapts　them　to　their　purpose；　they　must
possess　something　in　mon　with　it。　Human　beings　least　of　all；　sustain　the　bare　external　relation
of　mere　means　to　the　great　ideal　aim。　Not　only　do　they　in　the　very　act　of　realising　it；　make　it　the
occasion　of　satisfying　personal　desires；　whose　purport　is　diverse　from　that　aim　—　but　they　share　in
that　ideal　aim　itself；　and　are　for　that　very　reason　objects　of　their　own　existence；　not　formally
merely；　as　the　world　of　living　beings　generally　is　—　whose　individual　life　is　essentially　subordinate
to　that　of　man；　and　is　properly　used　up　as　an　instrument。　Men；　on　the　contrary；　are　objects　of
existence　to　themselves；　as　regards　the　intrinsic　import　of　the　aim　in　question。　To　this　order
belongs　that　in　them　which　we　would　exclude　from　the　category　of　mere　means；　…　Morality；　Ethics；
Religion。　That　is　to　say；　man　is　an　object　of　existence　in　himself　only　in　virtue　of　the　Divine　that　is　in
him；　—　that　which　was　designated　at　the　outset　as　Reason；　which；　in　view　of　its　activity　and　power
of　self…determination；　was　called　Freedom。　And　we　affirm　—　without　entering　at　present　on　the
proof　of　the　assertion　…that　Religion；　Morality；　&c。　have　their　foundation　and　source　in　that
principle；　and　so　are　essentially　elevated　above　all　alien　necessity　and　chance。　And　here　we　must
remark　that　individuals；　to　the　extent　of　their　freedom；　are　responsible　for　the　depravation　and
enfeeblement　of　morals　and　religion。　This　is　the　seal　of　the　absolute　and　sublime　destiny　of　man　—
that　be　knows　what　is　good　and　what　is　evil；　that　his　destiny　is　his　very　ability　to　will　either　good　or
evil；　—　in　one　word；　that　he　is　the　subject　of　moral　imputation；　imputation　not　only　of　evil；　but　of
good；　and　not　only　concerning　this　or　that　particular　matters　and　all　that　happens　ab　extra；　but
also　the　good　and　evil　attaching　to　his　individual　freedom。　The　brute　alone　is　simply　innocent。　It
would；　however　demand　an　extensive　explanation　—　as　extensive　as　the　analysis　of　moral　freedom
itself　—　to　preclude　or　obviate　all　the　misunderstandings　which　the　statement　that　what　is　called
innocent　imports　the　entire　unconsciousness　of　evil　—　is　wont　to　occasion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　38

In　contemplating　the　fate　which　virtue；　morality；　even　piety　experience　in　history；　we　must　not　fall
into　the　Litany　of　Lamentations；　that　the　good　and　pious　often　—　or　for　the　most　part　—　fare　ill　in
the　world；　while　the　evil…disposed　and　wicked　prosper。　The　term　prosperity　is　used　in　a　variety　of
meanings　—　riches；　outward　honour；　and　the　like。　But　in　speaking　of　something　which　in　and　for
itself　constitutes　an　aim　of　existence；　that　so…called　well　or　ill…faring　of　these　or　those　isolated
individuals　cannot　be　regarded　as　an　essential　element　in　the　rational　order　of　the　universe。　With
more　justice　than　happiness　—　or　a　fortunate　environment　for　individuals；　—　it　is　demanded　of　the
grand　aim　of　the　world's　existence；　that　it　should　foster；　nay　involve　the　execution　and　ratification
of　good；　moral；　righteous　purposes。　What　makes　men　morally　discontented　（a　discontent；　by　the
bye；　on　which　they　somewhat　pride　themselves）；　is　that　they　do　not　find　the　present　adapted　to　the
realisation　of　aims　which　they　hold　to　be　right　and　just　（more　especially　in　modern　times；　ideals　of
political　constitutions）；　they　contrast　unfavourably　things　as　they　are；　with　their　idea　of　things　as
they　ought　to　be。　In　this　case　it　is　not　private　interest　nor　passion　that　desires　gratification；　but
Reason；　Justice；　Liberty；　and　equipped　with　this　title；　the　demand　in　question　assumes　a　lofty
bearing；　and　readily　adopts　a　position　not　merely　of　discontent；　but　of　open　revolt　against　the
actual　condition　of　the　world。　To　estimate　such　a　feeling　and　such　views　aright；　the　demands
insisted　upon；　and　the　very　dogmatic　opinions　asserted；　must　be　examined。　At　no　time